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What impact has financial globalization had on risk sharing? In 
theory, financial globalization should improve international consump- 
tion risk sharing. While the answer to this question is of utmost poli- 
cymaking concern, results in the empirical literature are inconclu- 
sive. The paper surveys the extant literature and tries to identify 
which factors influence the answer: i) consumption risk sharing seems 
to have increased among industrialized countries but much less in 
the emerging world. ii) The increase in risk sharing is generally found 
to be stronger in studies that focus on the trends rather than purely 
cyclical variation in the data. iii) globalization has not only affected 
consumption responses to output shocks but also the structure of 
these shocks themselves. This, in turn, has affected the measure- 
ment of risk sharing. The paper examines the relevance of these po- 
ints on a sample of East Asian Economies. My results indicate that 
risk sharing in East Asia has started to increase once the region had 
recovered from the Asian crisis.
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I. Introduction
The last decades saw an unprecedented growth in international capital 
and trade flows. This wave of globalization encompassed not only indus- 
trialized economies but also the emerging world. For emerging markets, 
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gross foreign asset positions― the cross-country average of the ratio bet- 
ween the sum of international assets and liabilities and GDP― increased 
from below 80 to roundabout 250 percent of GDP over the period from 
1985 to 2004.
Better diversification of individual consumption risks is one of the key 
functions of financial markets and was a key intellectural impetus be- 
hind the financial liberalizations that we have seen around the world 
over the last quarter century. From a theoretical point of view, increased 
international gross holdings of financial assets should ultimately lead to 
improved international consumption risk sharing. However, while inter- 
national gross holdings have indeed exploded, the empirical evidence 
for better international risk sharing seems― at least at first sight― in- 
conclusive. In this paper I review the extant literature and seek to iden- 
tify the factors that lead different strands of this literature to come to 
different conclusions with respect to the impact of financial globaliza- 
tion on risk sharing. I then bring to bear the insights distilled from this 
review on a sample of Asian countries. 
Three factors seem particularly important in determining the answer 
to the question asked in the title of the paper: first, the sample of coun- 
tries. Financial globalization seems to have had a much more pronounced 
effect on risk sharing among industrialized economies than among em- 
erging economies. Poor, developing countries seem to have remained al- 
most completely excluded from the risk sharing benefits from globaliza- 
tion.
Secondly, the effect of globalization on consumption patterns is much 
more readily detectable in trend movements in the data rather than at 
the business cycle frequency. I argue that this is in line with the pre- 
dictions of theoretical models: on the one hand, the welfare benefits 
from insuring against trend (permanent) shocks should be much bigger. 
Hence, for a given marginal cost of buying insurance in financial markets, 
we should see that improvements in risk sharing show up in the lower 
frequency at first. 
A third point I focus on is that globalization is likely to affect not only 
the way in which households, regions and countries insure against 
shocks but that it is likely to alter the structure of the shocks themselves. 
If international risk sharing is incomplete―which it certainly was and, 
in spite of globalization, still is― then extant measures of risk sharing 
such as consumption correlations or conditional consumption volatilities 
will be affected by the nature of the shocks. As I will argue, this may 
blur or even offset the impact that financial globalization has on such 
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indicators.
This third point seems particularly relevant in the Asian context. Since 
the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, business cycle patterns in East Asia 
have undergone substantial changes. Increased bilateral trade within the 
region has contributed to the emergence of a more synchronized regional 
business cycle pattern that, at the same time appears increasingly dis- 
tinct from that of western economies (see Kose, Otrok, and Prasad 2008; 
Kim, Lee, and Park 2009; He and Liao 2011; Hoffmann and Liao 2011). 
In evaluating how financial globalization has impacted on international 
consumption risk sharing by Asia's emerging economies, it therefore 
seems imperative to take account of these shifts. I do so by building on 
the framework we developed in Artis and Hoffmann (2008b) which allows 
to purge consumption-based measures of international risk sharing from 
changes in the international comovement of growth trends and cycles. I 
find that, even controlling for the marked changes in the region's busi- 
ness cycle patterns, risk sharing in Asia has started to increase after 
the recovery from the Asian crisis. While this increase has clearly hap- 
pened a lot later than among industrialized economies, to my knowledge 
this is the first evidence on improved risk sharing among a sample of 
predominantly emerging economies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section 
provides a brief outline of the theoretical backdrop. Section three than 
offers an interpretative review of the literature that illustrates my three 
points above: to what extent risk sharing has been increased by finan- 
cial globalization depends a) on the country sample, b) on the frequency 
at which we examine the data, and c) on the concurrent impact of glo- 
balization on the patterns of international business cycle comovement. 
In Section four, I then illustrate the relevance of these points for a sample 
of Asian economies. Section five concludes.
II. Consumption-based Measures of Risk Sharing1
The point of departure of virtually all empirical studies in the field is 
a benchmark model with complete financial markets and frictionless 
trade in goods. In such a model, marginal utility growth in country or 
region k equals the growth in the shadow price of consumption and is 
therefore equalized across countries:
1 This section draws on Artis and Hoffmann (2008b).
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(1)
where u’(.) is the period utility function, Ct
k
 measures consumption in 
country k and μt the shadow price of consumption. A first implication 
of this equation is that marginal utility growth should be perfectly cor- 
related across countries. To the extent that variability of marginal utility 
can directly be associated with consumption fluctuations (as is the case 
under CRRA utility), this implies that international consumption correl- 
ations should be close to unity. Studies that have focused on this impli- 
cation of the model have generally documented the consumption correl- 
ation or ‘quantity' puzzle (Backus, Kehoe, Kydland 1992): international 
consumption correlations tend to be lower than the corresponding output 
correlations. However, as discussed in our earlier work, if consumption 
is subject to measurement error or preference shocks, consumption cor- 
relations could be low for other reasons than just a failure to share risk. 
This is why much of the literature has focused on a second implication 
of Equation (1): since growth in the shadow price is common to all coun- 
tries, the difference between marginal utility growth in two countries, 
while not necessarily zero, should be statistically independent of any 
country-specific risk-variables, notably relative endowments. This rea- 










 is a vector of time-varying country characteristics that capture 
idiosyncratic risk, such as relative output growth; lower case letters de- 





－Δct* is the growth rate of consumption in country k relative to 
the world growth rate Δct*. Under full insurance all elements of the co- 
efficients vector b should then be zero.2 As we discussed in Artis and 
Hoffmann (2008b), the key advantage of this regression-based formulation 
vs. the correlation-based measures is that it is robust even if consump- 
tion is driven by unobserved factors, such as measurement error and 
preference shocks― provided these factors are uncorrelated with the 
idiosyncratic risk characteristics Xt
k.
2 Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) were the first authors to investigate regres- 
sion of this type in household-level data.
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In the macroeconomic literature, most researchers have specialized Xt
k 







,                           (2)
where Δŷk is the idiosyncratic growth rate of output in country k and μk 
is a country fixed effect. Artis and Hoffmann (2008b) call this equation 
the ‘basic risk sharing regression.' If financial markets are complete, the 
coefficient estimate of b should be zero or close to zero: a country's 
consumption patterns (relative to the rest of the world) should be in- 
dependent of its business cycle (i.e., output growth) movements. In the 
data, panel estimates of b are typically between zero and one. Starting 
with Asdrubali, So̸rensen and Yosha (1996), many researchers have there- 
fore used b as a measure of risk sharing that indicates what fraction of 
idiosyncratic risk remains unshared. A typical estimate of b obtained 
from a panel of regions within a country (say US federal states) is around 
0.25, which suggests that roughly a quarter of idiosyncratic output fluc- 
tuations remain uninsured among a country's regions. Based on data 
from industrialized countries, most studies find that between 60 and 80 
percent of idiosyncratic fluctuations appear to remain uninsured with 
the exact value depending somewhat on the country sample and the 
time period. When comparing these estimates from international data to 
the ones typical obtained for the regions within (industrialized) coun- 
tries,3 it becomes apparent that there is a lack of international consump- 
tion risk sharing.
As financial globalization has progressed, however, we would expect 
that this ‘lack of risk sharing' has become less severe. The growth in 
international gross asset positions should help diversify national output 
risks and therefore help decouple relative consumption movements from 
idiosyncratic business cycle movements― the estimate of b obtained 
from international data should have declined over time.
As I argue in the next section, the evidence to this effect appears―
at least at first sight― rather inconclusive. However, I argue that there 
is a lot of structure in these results and the section will therefore also 
seek to identify the factors that drive differences in results across dif- 
3 I emphasize ‘industrialized' here. Evidence for intra-national risk sharing in 
emerging economies is relatively sparse but results for countries such as China 
indicate that emerging markets typically also have lower levels of intra-national 
risk sharing. See e.g., Xu (2008).
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ferent studies.
III. Has Consumption Risk Sharing Increased?
    ― A Synthesis of the Literature
This section attempts to synthesize the results from recent studies 
that have examined whether consumption risk sharing has increased 
with financial globalization. I identify three dimensions which drive dif- 
ferences in the results among these studies: i) the country sample, ii) 
the frequency of the data they focus on, and iii) whether they account 
for the possibility that globalization also affects the structure of shocks.
A. Country Samples
Probably the first study to systematically explore the impact of finan- 
cial globalization on risk sharing among industrialized countries is So̸
rensen et al. (2007). These authors run the basic risk sharing regres- 







so that they obtain a time-varying sequence of risk sharing coefficients 
{b(t)}. While the individual estimates of {b(t)} fluctuate very strongly, a 
smoothed sequence shows a downward trend. So̸rensen et al. further 
examine the link between globalization and risk sharing by explicitly con- 
ditioning the estimate of b(t) on the growth international asset positions. 
To this end they specify regressions in which they interact idiosyncratic 




















stands, in turn, for relative income or relative consumption growth. In 
these specifications, the coefficient b1 is generally found to be negative, 
suggesting that higher international cross-holdings of assets do indeed 
go in hand with better international risk sharing. However, the results 
are somewhat sensitive to the exact definition of FA and to whether xt
k 
is chosen to be income or consumption: the evidence in favor of inter- 
national asset holdings increasing the independence of income (GNP) 
flows from output is somewhat stronger than that for consumption risk 
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sharing as a whole. This is interesting, because earlier studies found 
that the lack of international capital income flows (as opposed to a lack 
of international credit or loan flows) is one of the main reasons for the 
perceived lack of international risk sharing: as discussed in So̸rensen 
and Yosha (1998) and Becker and Hoffmann (2006), the extent of con- 
sumption smoothing through credit markets is similar within and between 
countries. 
A much broader sample of countries is examined in Kose, Prasad, and 
Terrones (2009). These authors confirm earlier results concerning the 
increase in risk sharing among industrialized countries. They do not 
find an increase in risk sharing among developing countries, however. 
There also does not seem to be a pronounced increase in risk sharing 
among emerging economies. These findings lead Kose, Prasad and Taylor 
(2011) to examine the role of threshold effects in financial integration: 
they convincingly show that a country will only be able to benefit from 
financial globalization if its political and economic institutions and its 
level of domestic financial development exceed a certain minimum level.
A similar form of non-linearities in the effects of financial globalization 
on risk sharing is explored by Imbs and Fratzscher (2009). Their sample 
also comprises of a broad set of economies, including industrialized eco- 
nomies, emerging markets and developing countries. Fratzscher and Imbs 
focus on the interaction between institutional development and (finan- 
cial) openness. While they find that bad institutions do indeed lower 
international risk sharing, they also show that greater financial openess 
tends to mitigate this impact of bad institutions. 
A number of studies have looked at the development of risk sharing 
in different world regions. Kalemli-Ozcan, So̸rensen, and Yosha (2005) 
examine the impact of financial integration among EU economies, finding 
that risk sharing has increased substantially. Artis and Hoffmann (2008a) 
focus on the low frequency interaction between relative consumption and 
output and also come to the conclusion that risk sharing has increased 
substantially among EU members. Interestingly, however, risk sharing 
among EU members is not generally higher than among the group of 
industrialized countries at large. However, it started to increase earlier 
and the risk sharing occurs through different channels, increasingly 
through capital income flows. Gerlach and Hoffmann (2010) look at what 
they call the ‘pivotal' role that the creation of EMU has played for in- 
creased risk sharing among industrialized countries at large: they find 
that risk sharing of non-EMU members with EMU members has in- 
creased following the inception of the common currency but that risk 
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sharing among non-EMU industrialized countries has decreased in turn. 
This seems to suggest that the creation of the common currency has a 
created a big common financial market that facilitates risk sharing 
globally.
First important evidence on risk sharing in the Asia-Pacific region is 
provided in Kim, Kim, and Wang (2004) and Kim, Kim, and Wang (2006). 
These authors show that risk sharing among Asian economies is ac- 
tually very low, much lower than among industrialized economies. Also, 
they do not find a substantial increase in this country group during the 
1990s. However, their sample ends in 2000, so that it remains unclear 
whether risk sharing in the Asian pacific has increased in the period 
since.
B. Risk Sharing: Permanent vs. Transitory Shocks
Most empirical studies use annual data, so that the basic risk sharing 
regression above is effectively formulated in annual growth rates. This 
setup tends to emphasize the interaction between relative consumption 
and relative output shocks at the business-cycle frequency. However, 
from a theoretical point of view, there are a number of reasons to be- 
lieve that it should matter for international risk sharing if a shock is 
perceived to be permanent or transitory― at least if financial markets 
are not entirely complete. I will review some of these reasons below, 
after discussing the empirical evidence.
Already in the seminal paper by ASY, the authors looked at versions 
of the risk sharing regression in which the data were differenced at 
longer horizons. Becker and Hoffmann (2006) identified permanent and 
transitory shocks in a cointegrated vector autoregression model (VECM). 
More recently Asdrubali and Kim (2008) have suggested an elegant de- 
composition of risk sharing into a long-term (insurance) and a short- 
term (smoothing) component based on the distinction between the within- 
and between panel estimators. All of these studies find that permanent 
(i.e., low frequency) idiosyncratic fluctuations in output among industri- 
alized countries are much less well insured than permanent shocks. 
Becker and Hoffmann (2006) identify this pattern as a main cause of the 
lack of international risk sharing: whereas transitory disturbances are 
almost completely smoothed in credit markets in both regional data 
(i.e., within countries) and between countries, permanent idiosyncratic 
shocks remain almost completely uninsured between countries but are 
at least partially insured among e.g., US federal states. 
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The data sets used in these studies generally end in the late 1990s, 
which does not allow them to explore systematically how financial glob- 
alization has affected international risk sharing of permanent shocks. 
We explored this issue in detail in Artis and Hoffmann (2006, 2008b). 
Using a setup similar to the one used by So̸rensen et al. (2007) discussed 
above, but focussing on regressions in relative log-levels rather than first 
differences, Artis and Hoffmann (2006) document a very strong link bet- 
ween the growth in the international cross-holdings of financial assets 
and improvements in risk sharing for a set of 23 OECD countries. Their 
log-level specification can be interpeted as a regression with an infinite 
differencing horizon that describes the sensitivity of relative consump- 
tion to relative output at frequency zero. The intuition is analogous to 
that of the basic risk sharing regression: in a world with perfect ex ante 
risk sharing, fluctuations in relative quantities of output should not have 
an impact on relative consumption levels. Formulating the risk sharing 
regression in (log-) levels and estimating it as a sequence of cross- 









Artis and Hoffmann (2006) can show that the ‘long-run' risk sharing 
coefficient shows a clear downward trend form the late 1980s onwards. 
Hence, the improvement in the sharing of permanent idiosyncratic shocks 
show up even without a need to condition the estimates on internation- 
al asset positions or a need to filter the estimates of b
LR (t )― as is often 
the case in the differenced regression.
Similar results are obtained by Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) who 
run regressions based on 3 and 5 year growth rates and Matsumoto, 
Flood, and Marion (2009) who look at the time-varying volatilities of 
consumption shares. These studies also find a very clear increase in risk 
sharing― at least among industrialized economies.
All of these studies seem to suggest that the increase in international 
risk sharing is more readily detected once one focuses on the lower fre- 
quency of the data. This, in turn, is consistent with what theory would 
suggest: first, insuring against permanent shocks carries much higher 
welfare gains, a point made in a substantial literature that I do not at- 
tempt to survey here (see e.g., Athanasoulis and van Wincoop 2000). 
Therefore, for a given cost of insuring in financial markets, households, 
regions, and countries will tend to buy insurance against permanent 
shocks first. Secondly, smoothing of transitory shocks can be achieved 
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using a rather limited menu of assets (e.g., bond or loans) whereas in- 
surance against permanent idiosyncratic fluctuations requires more so- 
phisticated, state-contingent assets, such as e.g., equity (see Baxter and 
Crucini 1995). Indeed, while bonds or loans have been internationally 
traded on a considerable scale even before the recent wave of financial 
globalization, the decline in equity portfolio home bias is a relatively re- 
cent phenomenon. It is therefore consistent with these shifting patterns 
of international asset ownership that they first and foremost lead to an 
improved diversification of persistent idiosyncratic risks, whereas transi- 
tory fluctuations seem to have been smoothed rather well all along (see 
e.g., Becker and Hoffmann 2006).
The question that arises against the backdrop of these results is why 
the simple risk sharing regression (2) has generally had a harder time 
detecting the increase in international risk sharing. I address this point 
next.
C. Globalization, Risk Sharing, and Business Cycle Patterns
All studies of international risk sharing that I have discussed so far 
take the structure of international shocks as given. From a theoretical 
point of view, however, correlations and conditional volatilities of con- 
sumption will themselves be a function of the structure of shocks. If, 
furthermore, trend (permanent) and cyclical (transitory) fluctuations in 
output constitute different risks― e.g., because they can only be insured 
using different assets― then the process of financial globalization could 
itself have an impact on the structure of economic shocks. Kalemli-Ozcan, 
So̸rensen, and Yosha (2001, 2003) have shown very persuasively that 
better access to finance leads countries to adopt a more specialized in- 
dustry structure: if shocks are predominantly sectoral, then specialization 
will lead to very volatile output fluctuations. Hence, in the absence of 
access to insurance, a country may choose to adopt a much more bal- 
anced mix of industries. This will tend to stabilize output. If consumption 
can be shielded from output fluctuations using financial markets, how- 
ever, then comparative advantage can be fully exploited, leading to more 
volatile output shocks. There may be other channels through which eco- 
nomic integration can affect international business cycle patterns. Frankel 
and Rose (1998) have shown that bilateral trade openness and business 
cycle synchronization are positively related. This could be due to demand 
spillovers or due to vertical specialization along the supply chain. Major 
shifts in the cross-country pattern of business cycles over the last two 
HAS CONSUMPTION RISK SHARING INCREASED IN ASIA? 561
decades have been documented by a number of studies. From the mid- 
1980s till at least the onset of the recent financial crisis, the volatility 
of business cycles has declined globally (Stock and Watson 2005), a 
phenomenon often referred to as the ‘great moderation.' More recently 
we have also seen the emergence of regional business cycles such as in 
the Euro area (Artis and Zhang 1997, 1999; Artis, Krolzig, and Toro 2004) 
and in the Asia-Pacific region (Kose, Otrok, and Prasad 2008; Kim, Lee, 
and Park 2009; Fujiwara and Takahashi 2011; Hoffmann and Liao 2011).
Whether or not such changes in international business cycle patterns 
are driven by globalization themselves or whether they occur concurrently, 
though possibly independently―my argument here will be that such 
shifts may blur or even offset the impact of financial globalization on 
extant consumption-based indicators of risk sharing. This can potentially 
explain why a number of studies have actually not identified an increase 
in consumption correlations or a drop in conditional consumption vola- 
tilities― the coefficient b― over the last two decades.4
The next section lays out a stylized framework that allows me to con- 
front these issues. The gist of my argument is simple: if financial markets 
are incomplete, then consumption correlations and conditional volatilities 
will themselves be a function of the structure of shocks. If, furthermore, 
trend (permanent) and cyclical (transitory) fluctuations in output consti- 
tute different risks― e.g., because they can only be insured using dif- 
ferent assets― then the basic risk sharing coefficient b will be a weighted 
sum of the degrees to which either type of shock is insured. The weights 
in this sum will be a function of the relative importance of trend and 
cyclical fluctuations. If shifts in international business cycle patterns―
changes in the volatility of cycles, increased synchronization etc.―
changes these weights, this may blur or even offset the impact of finan- 
cial globalization on b. 
IV. Partial Insurance in a Permanent Income Model
In this section, I briefly describe the framework by Artis and Hoffmann 
(2008b), which builds on Crucini (1999). In this model, a county can buy 
into a world mutual fund that pays world average output as a dividend. 
Therefore, income growth is a weighted sum of domestic and world 
4 See e.g., the results in Imbs (2006) and Bai and Zhang (2005). Heathcote 
and Perri (2004) even report that international consumption correlations have 
decreased for the U.S.







Here, ω measures the fraction of country k's wealth held in the mu- 
tual fund― the index of financial globalization used in this paper. We 
further assume that, once income is observed, the country can fully 
smooth the effect of any transitory fluctuations in consumption through 








P,               (3)
where the superscript `P' denotes the permanent component. This simple 
setup captures the idea that permanent and transitory shocks constitute 
different sources of risk. Diversifying the risks with permanent idiosyn- 
cratic output shocks requires access to a state-contingent asset― the 
world mutual fund. If ω＝0, then there is no international diversification 
and the country obtains no insurance against permanent idiosyncratic 
output shocks, whereas if ω＝1, insurance against such shocks will be 
complete. In general, we expect 0＜ω＜1, reflecting our assumption that 
due to various frictions it is costly to obtain insurance in international 
financial markets. This is what Artis and Hoffmann (2008b) and Heathcote 
et al. (2007) call partial insurance. Conversely, the setup assumes that 
the effect of transitory shocks to income on consumption can be com- 
pletely eliminated, e.g., through international borrowing and lending. This 
is a usual assumption underlying the entire class of permanent-income 
models.
For the world as whole it holds that Δ c*＝Δinc*P＝Δy*P, so that we can 
rewrite Equation (3) as
c ̂tk＝(1－ω )ŷtkP.                         (4)
where the hat, again, denotes the idiosyncratic growth rate of the respec- 
tive variable (e.g., y ̂tkP＝Δ ytkP－Δ yt*P ). Equation (4) suggests a regression 








                           (5)
in which, under the null of our model, bP＝(1－ω ). Secondly, the model 
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implies that the coefficient bT in the regression
c ̂tk＝bTŷtkT＋vtk,                          (6)
where ΔŷT＝Δŷ－ΔŷP, should equal zero― transitory variation in relative 
outputs should not have an impact on relative consumption. In dealing 
with the data, we do not wish to impose bT directly. According to Artis 
and Hoffmann (2008b) ‘the assumption that transitory fluctuations can 
actually be smoothed away completely whereas insurance against per- 
manent shocks is generally incomplete is just a metaphor for saying that 
existing financial markets make it harder for countries to insure against 
permanent shocks than against transitory fluctuations.'
Artis and Hoffmann (2008b) call bP and bT the `structural' risk sharing 
coefficients. It is then easy to show that the coefficient of the basic risk 
sharing regression (2) can be written as
= +
ˆ ˆvar( ) var( ) .
ˆ ˆvar( ) var( )
P T
P T
y yb b b
y y                       
(7)
where the hat again denotes the idiosyncratic growth rate of the respec- 
tive variable. For convenience, here and in the remainder of the paper, 
we drop the country and time indexes to denote cross-country averages 
of the respective moments. From this equation it is now easy to see that 
a decline in the structural risk sharing coefficients can be offset (or, for 
that matter, reinforced) by changes in the ratios var( ŷ
P)/var( ŷ) and var
( ŷ
T)/var( ŷ). In the simple permanent-income model here it should be 
the case that bT＝0― a restriction that is also close to what is found in 
the data, both in our earlier analysis of industrialized countries and in 
the empirical analysis for Asia below. Then, with bT＝0 and bP＝(1－ω ) 
we can write (7) 
b＝(1－ω)φ,                           (8)
where φ＝var( ŷP )/var( ŷ) is the share of permanent fluctuations in the 
variance of country-specific output growth. Following Artis and Hoffmann 
(2008b), I refer to φ as the long-term variance ratio.
Based on this decomposition, it is now possible to trace changes in b 
over time. Specifically, b may have increased even though (1－ω ) has 
actually decreased: if φ increases enough, this effect could offset the 
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impact of financial globalization on b. In our earlier work, we suggest to 
interpret φ as an indicator of the strength of Deatonesque effects: if 
contemporaneous output growth is less volatile than long-term output 
growth, so that φ＞1, this implies that changes in output today are 
likely to be followed by larger changes tomorrow. A permanent-income 
consumer, however, will anticipate these long-run changes, implying that 
her consumption (in relation to output) today reacts by more than 1－
ω. This overshooting of consumption, however, is nothing else than op- 
timizing behaviour in a permanent-income model― and not a failure to 
share risk. But this overshooting will tend to increase the volatility of 
consumption conditional on output today relative to the case where φ＝
1, i.e., where output volatility today, var( ŷ), just equals trend output 
volatility, var( ŷ
P ).
Clearly, as patterns of international business cycle comovement change, 
this will tend to alter the relative importance of trend growth and cyclical 
components in the country-specific components of output growth. In 
the next section, I therefore apply this framework to data from a group 
of economies in Asia.
V. Econometric Implementation
A. Constructing Permanent Components
To estimate the risk sharing regressions (5) and (6), I need an eco- 
nometric measure of the permanent component of domestic and foreign 
output growth. Again I follow our previous work in Artis and Hoffmann 
(2008b) and construct y
p from a log-linearied relation for the present- 
value of output:
1
log[ ] ( ).P P kt t t t k
k




= ≈ + Δ∑ E
                  
(9)
where R＝(1＋r )
－1 is a discount factor to be fixed. I choose r＝0.02. I 
then specify processed for Δ yt and Δ y* to proxy for the expectations 
involved in (9). Like in our earlier work, I follow Crucini (1999) and first 
consider separate AR(1)－processes for Δ y and Δ y* respectively. I then 
also estimate a VAR(1) for the joint dynamics of home and world output 
growth. See Artis and Hoffmann (2008b) for the details.5
5 Unlike Artis and Hoffmann (2008b), I do not include relative consumption 
growth rates in the VAR though. The reason is that, though in principle infor- 
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B. Data and Estimation
The analysis in this paper is based on annual data from the Penn 
World Table, release 6.3 (PWT 6.3.). The sample ranges from 1973 to 
2007. All data are in constant international prices. The sample covers 
the following Asian economies:
1. China, 2. Hong Kong, 3. Indonesia, 4. Japan, 5. Korea, 6. Malaysia, 
7. The Philippines, 8. Singapore, 9. Taiwan, 10. Thailand, and 11. 
Vietnam. 
I report results for two (equal length) sub-periods: 1973-1989 and 
1990-2007. The former is the pre-globalization period whereas the period 
after 1990 has been marked by a wave of financial liberalization around 
the world. However, for the Asian economies, the financial crisis of 1997/ 
1998 clearly is expected to mark a watershed. Therefore, I further split 
the period of global liberalization into the sub-periods 1990-1996 and―
excluding the crisis and its immediate aftermath― a period covering 
the years 2000-2007. 
Following my earlier work with Mike Artis, I estimated all risk sharing 
regressions with a panel two-stage least squares procedure. First, the 
respective risk sharing equation is estimated by panel OLS, controlling 
for country-fixed effects. To control for heteroscedasticity, all variables 
are then weighted by the country-specific variance of the first stage re- 
siduals and the model is re-estimated.6
VI. Empirical Results
A. Baseline Regressions
Table 1 presents the results of the basic risk sharing regression for the 
mative about future output growth, consumption in these countries is likely to 
be measured with a lot of noise over our sample period.
6 Note that in all the panel specifications here, variables are expressed in 
growth rates relative to the group (of Asian economies) average. This is effectively 
equivalent to including time effects and therefore also controls for the joint im- 
pact of any global fluctuations (outside Asia) on these economies. However, it 
should be noted that this setup― very much as in virtually all empirical con- 
sumption risk sharing studies― affects the interpretation of the estimated co- 
efficients: the estimated coefficients capture the extent of risk sharing within the 
group of economies in the sample and have no direct implications for the extent 
of risk sharing with countries or regions outside this group.
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Notes: Panel regressions of the form c ̂tk＝bŷtk＋δ＋μk＋εtk where δ, μk, and εtk 
are the constant term, the country (region) fixed effect and the residual 
term respectively. The hat denotes idiosyncratic growth rates. Numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics based on the weighted least squares pro- 
cedure described in the main text.
TABLE 1
BASIC RISK SHARING REGRESSIONS
four sub-periods. The estimated coefficient for the period 1973-1989 is 
0.66, suggesting that roughly one third of idiosyncratic shocks actually 
got shared among the countries in the sample. This is almost the same 
number that is obtained for the period 1990-2007 however. Here we 
estimate b＝0.63, which is not significantly different from the value ob- 
tained for the previous 18 years. Splitting the post-1990 period into the 
period before the Asian crisis― 1990-1996― even reveals a coefficient 
of 0.77. This suggests that actually less risk got shared between East 
Asia's economies in the first half of the 1990s than before. Overall, these 
estimates are very much in line with those reported by Kim, Kim, and 
Wang (2006) and they would suggest that risk sharing in Asia has not 
increased.
Turning to the last part of the sample period, however, we do see a 
marked drop in our estimate of b. This number now appears to suggest 
extremely high levels of risk sharing― roughly three quarters of an idi- 
osyncratic output shock would appear to be shared among East Asian 
economies. This value for b is in the order of magnitude of the estimates 
obtained for risk sharing among the regions of highly developed indus- 
trialized economies (see e.g., Asdrubali, So̸rensen, and Yosha 1996).
These estimates reveal an interesting pattern: on the one hand, it 
seems that risk sharing has not substantially increased among Asian 
economies in the first part of the period of world-wide globalization, i.e., 
before the Asian crisis of 1997/98. This is in line with earlier findings 
for these countries covering the same period. On the other hand, once 
Asia had recovered from the crisis, the impact of financial globalization 
on risk sharing is extremely strong. This pattern contrasts sharply with 
extant results on industrialized countries for which we find a more gra- 
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Specification



































Notes: Panel regressions of the form c ̂tk＝bP ŷtkP＋δ＋μk＋εtk and c ̂tk＝bTŷtkT＋δ＋
μk＋εt
k
 where δ, μk, and εt
k
 are the constant term, the country (region) 
fixed effect and the residual term respectively. Numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics based on the weighted least squares procedure described 
in the main text. The first column identifies which specification for 
ŷ＝Δy－Δy* was used in the construction of permanent and transitory 
components.
TABLE 2
SHARING OF PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK
dual increase that is detectable from the late 1980s onwards (see e.g., 
Artis and Hoffmann 2006, 2008b; So̸rensen et al. 2007).
As I have argued before, however, this pattern should not be taken at 
face value until we have controlled for concurrent changes in the patterns 
of comovement of national business cycles among our sample countries. 
Clearly, the Asian crisis and the rapid structural transformation of Asia's 
economies over the last 20 years makes such an analysis appear parti- 
cularly relevant.
B. Insurance of Permanent and Transitory Shocks
Table 2 presents the results of the modified risk sharing regressions 
that differentiate between permanent and transitory components. For each 
subperiod, we report results based on the two methods of constructing 
the permanent and transitory components discussed in the previous sec- 
tion: one in which home and foreign output growth follow univariate AR
(1) processes and one in which they are jointly determined by a VAR(1). 
The latter allows for the possibility of spillovers in business cycles, so that 
foreign growth rates may affect expectations of future output growth at 
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home and vice-versa.
The estimates of bP are reported in the first panel. For the pre-1990 
period they are around 0.45, suggesting that slightly more than 50 per- 
cent of permanent idiosyncratic shocks got shared among the countries 
in this sample during this period. For the period after 1990, I detect a 
marked drop in bP. However this drop seems too strong to be plausible: 
based on both the AR and the VAR, the estimate of bP is now around 
0.15. Clearly, this could be affected by the large common shocks of the 
Asian crisis. Splitting the sample again and excluding the crisis years 
themselves, shows that this is indeed the case: now, for the 1990-1996 
subperiod, I find estimates of bP that are very similar to the pre-1990 
period. Conversely, For the post-2000 period there is a sharp drop: based 
on the AR(1) I estimate bP＝0.17― similar to the baseline estimate in 
Table 1. For the (richer) VAR(1) specification, I find bP＝0.34. 
Turning to the second panel, it is apparent that all estimates of bT, 
the extent of risk sharing of the transitory shocks, are generally zero and 
insignificant. This corroborates the results in Artis and Hoffmann (2008b) 
on a new sample of Asian economies here, confirming the assumption 
of the simple model of partial insurance in which transitory shocks can 
be completely smoothed through borrowing and lending.7
Over the last decade, following the Asian crisis, many Asian economies 
have pursued deliberate policies of reserve accumulation. These stocks 
of foreign reserves could act as a buffer-stock of precautionary savings 
that allows countries to smooth idiosyncratic shocks.8 It is worth noting, 
however, that intertemporal smoothing is ultimately only possible with 
respect to transitory shocks. The results here, however, suggest that it 
is predominantly insurance against permanent shocks―and not improved 
smoothing of transitory shocks― that accounts for the improvements in 
risk sharing (here widely understood as the sum of all smoothing and 
insurance mechanisms). Prima facie, the pattern I document here would 
therefore suggest that is mainly improved capital market integration and 
not so much the use of government currency reserves that has contri- 
buted to improved risk sharing among Asian economies.9
7 The finding is also consistent with Kim, Kim, and Wang (2006) who decom- 
pose output shocks into an income and a consumption smoothing component, 
following ASY 1996. They find that during their sample period―which ends in 
2000― risk sharing among Asian economies was predominantly achieved through 
consumption smoothing.
8 Choi and Baek (2006) provide evidence of a link between portfolio-flow vola- 
tility and reserve accumulation.









































Notes: The table presents the impact of changes in business cycle and long- 
run volatility (var ( ŷ) and var( ŷP ) respectively) on the risk sharing co- 
efficient. Calculations of permanent components ŷ
P
 based on the VAR. 
For the calculation of badj＝b/φ the estimates of b from table 1 were 
used.
TABLE 3
BUSINESS CYCLE VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING REGRESSIONS
Summing up, the findings in this subsection corroborate the patterns, I 
documented in Table 1: till the onset of the Asian crisis, risk sharing 
among Asian economies was rather low. However, it seems that financial 
globalization clearly made its impact felt in terms of better international 
risk sharing, following the recovery from the crisis. It is interesting to 
see that this pattern does not seem to be affected by controlling for 
changes in the structure of business cycles.
C. Changes in Business Cycle Patterns
I further assess the importance of changes in business cycles patterns 
in Table 3. For each subperiod, the table reports the standard deviations 
of output growth, trend growth and the long-run variance ratio, φ. Fol- 
lowing Artis and Hoffmann (2008b), the last column gives a business- 
cycle adjusted measure of risk sharing, badj＝b/φ. As is easily apparent 
9 Still, my results do not allow me to entirely rule out a role of reserves for 
improved risk sharing. The sample on which my construction of permanent and 
transitory components is based is necessarily rather short. It is therefore possible 
that some transitory but long-lived shocks get classified as permanent. These 
transitory shocks could in principle also be smoothed through intertemporal 
smoothing, including the use of reserves. Conversely, international reserve hold- 
ings have by now reached levels that would allow many Asian economies to smooth 
idiosyncratic shocks over very long horizons. A detailed study of the use of in- 
ternational reserves for risk sharing (e.g., during the recent global crisis) is a very 
interesting area for future research.
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from Equation (8), this is the value of the risk sharing coefficient b 
which should prevail if bT＝0, so that under the null of the model, badj 
should be equal to bP＝(1－ω ). Hence, very much as bP, the coefficient 
badj should give us the degree of international risk sharing corrected for 
the underlying changes in the relative importance of trend and cyclical 
variation in (idiosyncratic) output growth.
First, the table clearly shows the impact of the Asian crisis on vola- 
tility: while output growth for the whole period 1990-2007 does not ap- 
pear much higher than in the pre-1990 period, this blurs differences 
across subperiods:10 as can be seen from the third and fourth rows of 
the table, both in the 1990-96 and in the 2000-20007 periods, var(ŷ) is 
actually lower than in the pre-1990 period. Hence, with the exception of 
the crisis years, (idiosyncratic) business cycle volatility in Asia actually 
seems to have declined.11
In spite of this decline in volatility, till the eve of the Asian crisis, the 
values of φ show that the relative importance of trend and cyclical vari- 
ation seems to have remained virtually constant between the pre-1990 
and the 1990-96 periods. The business-cycle adjusted risk sharing coef- 
ficient displays a slight increase between the two periods.
The period after the end of the crisis and the turn of the millenium 
then sees a huge drop in trend relative to output growth volatility which 
is reflected in a much lower value of φ (0.8 instead of 1.39). This drop 
in φ could reflect an increased synchronization of trend movements 
among Asia's emerging economies that sometimes has been refereed to 
as de-coupling (see Kose, Otrok, and Prasad 2008; Kim, Lee, and Park 
2009; He and Liao 2011; Hoffmann and Liao 2011). Hence, it would seem 
that the enormous drop in the baseline coefficient b that I documented 
in Table 1 for this subperiod is indeed partly explained by changes in 
the structure of business cycles. However, as the adjusted coefficient in 
the last column of Table 3 (as well as the estimates of bP is Table 2) 
show, this drop in φ is not sufficient to explain all of the drop in b: the 
coefficients bP and badj have fallen as well― risk sharing in Asia has 
started to increase after the Asian crisis.
10 Clearly, the crisis years have a huge impact on the estimate of permanent 
components, leading to a huge increase in var(ŷ
P
) and a jump in φ.
11 Since var(ŷ)＝var(Δ y)－2cov(Δ y, Δ y*)＋var(Δ y*), this is consistent with the 
emergence of more regionally synchronized business cycles in Asia.
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V. Conclusion
The subprime crisis and the global recession that followed it have made 
many observers critical of the benefits of financial globalization. One of 
these benefits should be that international risk sharing has actually in- 
creased. In this paper, I have reviewed recent empirical work on this link 
between risk sharing and globalization, arguing that differences in em- 
pirical results across studies can be explained by three main factors: first, 
the country sample. Papers that have focused on industrialized countries 
alone have generally found somewhat stronger evidence in favour of more 
risk sharing, whereas emerging markets and developing countries seem 
to have been largely excluded from reaping the risk sharing benefits of 
financial globalization. Secondly, the impact of financial globalization on 
risk sharing is generally found to be stronger in studies that have looked 
at the lower-frequency movements of consumption and output. As I have 
argued here and elsewhere, this is consistent with a range of theoretical 
models all of which predict that the benefits of risk sharing should be 
higher in the low frequency, while at the same time, these risks are 
harder to insure given the usual menu of available assets. Third, to the 
extent that risk sharing is incomplete, the structure of shocks― or busi- 
ness cycles―matters for extant measures of consumption risk sharing. 
Building on some of my earlier work with various coauthors, I have 
illustrated the relevance of these points on a sample of Asian countries. 
My results suggest that globalization has affected business cycle patterns 
in Asia, but that it has also increased risk sharing since the beginning 
of the millenium, after the region's recovery from the Asian crisis. To 
my knowledge, this is the first evidence to suggest that there risk sharing 
increased substantially among a sample of emerging economies.
(Received 19 May 2011; Revised 18 August 2011; Accepted 19 August 
2011)
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